A structural approach for analyzing fiscal equalization by Langørgen, Audun
Discussion 
Papers
Statistics Norway
Research department
No. 715 •
November 2012
Audun Langørgen
A structural approach for analyzing 
fi scal equalization
Discussion Papers No. 715, November 2012 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Audun Langørgen 
A structural approach for analyzing fiscal 
equalization 
 
Abstract: 
Many countries apply cost-equalization and/or fiscal capacity equalization formulas to enable sub-
national governments to provide comparable service standards at comparable tax rates. This paper 
demonstrates how measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity can be derived from a 
structural model of local government spending and taxing behavior. The structural parameters are 
shown to provide the information required to implement equalization according to the principle of 
horizontal equity. 
Keywords: Fiscal Equalization, Expenditure Needs, Fiscal Capacity, Structural Modeling 
JEL classification: H71, H72 
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Development for financial support, and Rolf Aaberge, Jens Dietrichson, Magne Mogstad 
and Jørn Rattsø for helpful suggestions and comments. 
Address: Audun Langørgen, Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
E-mail: audun.langorgen@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
© Statistics Norway 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers 
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
Statistics Norway 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
E-mail: Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
 
ISSN 0809-733X 
Print: Statistics Norway 
3 
Sammendrag 
Mange land benytter formler for utgiftsutjevning og/eller inntektsutjevning for å sikre at kommunene 
kan tilby et likeverdig tjenestetilbud for et gitt nivå på skattesatsene. Denne studien diskuterer hvordan 
mål på utgiftsbehov og fiskal kapasitet kan utledes fra en strukturell modell for kommunenes 
økonomiske atferd. Det blir vist at strukturparametrene i modellen gir oss den informasjonen som er 
nødvendig for å gjennomføre utjevning i samsvar med prinsippet om horisontal likhet. 
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Introduction 
Intergovernmental transfers are a major source of sub-national government financing in many 
countries around the world. Central governments frequently refer to equity goals to justify the 
distributional profiles of the grants to local governments. Therefore, a common purpose of 
intergovernmental transfers is to enable local authorities to provide a standard package of public 
services at an equal local tax rate or tax effort. Such policies, which are termed fiscal equalization, 
seek to compensate local governments with high expenditure needs or low fiscal capacity. Expenditure 
needs are defined as the costs of providing a standard package of public services. These costs may 
vary due to environmental factors and demographic characteristics that are beyond the control of local 
authorities.1 Fiscal capacity is defined as the ability of local governments to raise revenues from local 
resources. The present paper aims to develop a theory–consistent framework for measuring 
expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. 
 
Conventional approaches. Measures of expenditure needs are frequently derived by employing 
regression-based methods. As indicated by MacNevin (2004) and Reschovsky (2007), there are two 
regression-based approaches: one relies on service-specific cost functions which typically depend on 
output of a given service, input prices and environmental factors.2 A limitation of this approach is that 
measures of public output are only accessible in exceptional cases. Given the demanding data 
requirements of the cost function approach, economists have introduced an alternative method called 
the reduced form expenditure function approach.3 This approach uses single-equation methods to 
assess expenditures as a function of input prices, environmental factors and taste variables that explain 
public preferences for different publicly provided goods. A concern with this method is how to 
provide a valid definition of expenditure needs as a function of reduced form parameters. 
 
A structural modeling approach. The present paper discusses a third approach for estimating 
expenditure needs, called the structural modeling approach.4 The structural approach specifies a 
complete model of local government fiscal and spending behavior and estimates parameters that 
characterize preferences and cost functions of local governments.  In other areas of research, advocates 
                                                     
1 Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) developed the concept of environmental variables affecting the production functions for 
local public services. 
2 See e.g. Downes and Pogue (1994), Reschovsky and Imazeki (2003) and Duncombe and Yinger (2005). These studies focus 
on special-purpose jurisdictions such as American school districts for which output measures are available. 
3 For discussions of reduced form regression analysis, see e.g. Auten (1974), Bradbury et al. (1984), Ladd (1994) and Shah 
(1996). 
4 See Yinger (1986) and Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) for structural analyses of the spending behavior of local 
governments. 
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of structural modeling have criticized the reduced form approach for estimating statistics that are not 
policy-invariant parameters of economic models and therefore have limited relevance for policy and 
welfare analysis. (See e.g. Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Deaton, 
2010). The present paper investigates what can be gained from structural modeling when the topic is 
fiscal equalization and measurement of local public expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. 
 
Local government behavior. This paper employs a model of local government spending and taxing 
behavior as a basis for defining measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity. It is demonstrated 
that target-group-specific production can be identified within a structural expenditure system where 
local governments have preferences over the allocation of production to service sectors and target 
groups. Local government utility is maximized subject to a budget constraint which includes 
specification of fixed costs and costs per unit of output by service sector, and where locally imposed 
taxes are treated as endogenous. The identification strategy is based on observable heterogeneity in 
fiscal capacity, fixed costs, and costs per unit of output. 
 
Horizontal equity. Identification of target-group-specific and sector-specific production forms the 
basis for providing a precise definition of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity is obtained when the 
output received per person in a given target group is equal across municipalities. A corresponding 
equalization scheme is derived, which allows local governments to provide services to all target 
groups to satisfy the principle of horizontal equity. This scheme is a function of the structural 
parameters in the model. Thus, a main contribution of this paper is to develop methods for designing 
fiscal equalization policies by utilizing parameters derived from economic theory. 
 
Comparison with reduced form. A second purpose of the paper is to compare structural model 
estimates to reduced form estimates. It is argued that reduced form parameters are not the relevant 
parameters of interest, since they mix together expenditure needs from different service sectors. 
Moreover, the empirical analysis based on Norwegian data finds that reduced form parameter 
estimates are biased for measuring the expenditure needs included in the compensation rule. 
Consequently, reduced form parameters do not provide the information required to simulate (or 
implement) the counterfactual equalization policy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the structural model derived from maximization 
of a Stone–Geary utility function for a given budget constraint. Section II derives a scheme for fiscal 
equalization from the structural model under the condition that the allocation of intergovernmental 
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grants is based on the principle of horizontal equity. Section III provides a comparison of structural 
and reduced form parameters. Section IV gives an account for the responsibilities and institutional 
features of local government in Norway, while Section V presents results of an empirical analysis 
using Norwegian data. A brief summary is given in Section VI. 
I. The structural model 
As demonstrated by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) and Aaberge et al. (2010), the linear expenditure 
system (LES) is a helpful model for describing the spending behavior of Norwegian municipalities, 
provided that the model accounts for heterogeneity in expenditure needs and preferences for allocation 
of income to different services.5 Local governments are assumed to have preferences regarding tax 
burden and over levels of output on S service sectors distributed to J different target groups. Tax 
burden is treated as a negative good and depends both on the local tax rate and the size of the local tax 
base. It is a common result of empirical analyses of local government behavior that unrestricted 
intergovernmental grants stimulate much more local public spending per unit of grants than do income 
transfers to the households within the community.6 By allowing lump sum grants and local tax bases to 
have different effects on local government fiscal choices, the treatment of tax burden as a negative 
good accommodates the well-known flypaper effect (“money sticks where it hits”).7 The utility kU  of 
local government k is assumed to be given by the following specification of a Stone–Geary utility 
function: 
 
(1)   ( ) ( )
1 1
log log ,
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k k k k ijk ijk ij
i j
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5 The model, which can be considered as a “community preference” model, treats public authorities as economic agents that 
maximize utility under the condition of a given budget constraint. For a discussion of the community preference model, see 
Wildasin (1986). In the present paper the model is further developed by allowing for a distinction between fixed and variable 
costs. 
6 A survey of this literature is provided in Hines and Thaler (1995). 
7 See Johnson (1979). 
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where kv  denotes the tax income, and ijkx  is the production of service i per person of target group j in 
municipality k. The parameter ijγ  is interpreted as the minimum quantity per person of service i 
targeted to group j and can also be considered as a measure of the local governments’ common 
assessment of the need for different services targeted to different population subgroups. By contrast, 
the parameter ijkβ , which can be interpreted as the marginal budget share for spending on group j in 
service sector i, is allowed to vary across municipalities. The parameter kθ  is equal to the marginal 
budget share distributed to the private sector as a reduction in the tax burden. Similar to Johnson 
(1979), the parameter kκ  is interpreted as the maximum acceptable level of local taxes. 
 
Local governments face fixed costs in the production of public services, simply because municipalities 
need administrative and political management, they have a legal duty to keep accounts, and they have 
to maintain a basic stock of buildings and service functions to be able to operate. These costs are fixed 
in the sense that they, in the short run, do not vary with the amount of production of different services. 
Fixed costs accrue for all municipalities irrespective of any production activity and do not increase 
with the size of the municipality. Fixed costs are therefore relatively high for small municipalities. 
 
For variable costs it is assumed that the cost per unit of service production may vary across 
municipalities and service sectors. Note, however, that unit costs do not vary as a function of output in 
the model, which is based on the assumption that production functions exhibit constant returns to 
scale.8 In order to distinguish between fixed and variable costs, total expenditure in service sector i is 
assumed to satisfy the following decomposition: 
 
(3)   , 1, 2,..., ,
F
ik
ik ik ik
k
u x i S
n
α
π= + =  
 
where iku  is expenditure per capita in service sector i. Fixed costs in service sector i are denoted 
F
ikα , 
kn  is the population size of municipality k, the costs per unit in the production of service i are ikπ , and 
ikx  is production per capita in service i. Thus, the variable costs in sector i are defined by ik ikxπ . 
Furthermore, the production in service sector i is allocated to target groups as follows: 
 
                                                     
8 In case unit costs depend on output the analysis becomes more complex since outputs are unobserved and endogenous. 
8 
(4)   
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where jkz  is the population share that belongs to target group j.
9 The specification of production, unit 
costs and fixed costs is used to decompose the budget of the local governments. The budget constraint 
requires total incomes to be allocated to spending on different service sectors. By utilizing the 
definitions in (3) and (4), it also requires resources to be allocated to fixed and variable costs and to 
different target groups: 
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where ky  is the block grant per capita received by local government k. Total income ( k ky v+ ) is the 
sum of block grant and tax income. By maximizing (1) subject to (5), the following expenditure 
system is obtained: 
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where Vijk ik ij jkzα π γ=  is minimum variable cost in sector i targeted to group j, 
1 1
S J
V
k ik ij jk
i j
zα π γ++
= =
=   is 
total minimum variable cost in municipality k, and 
1
S
F F
k ik
i
α α+
=
=  is total fixed cost in municipality k. 
Discretionary income is defined by 
F
Vk
k k k
k
y
n
α
κ α+ +++ − − , which is the income potential remaining 
when the fixed costs and minimum variable costs have been covered. Exclusion restrictions of the type 
0ijγ =  capture the fact that all target groups do not necessarily receive all services. 
                                                     
9 Note that multiplication by jkz  changes the normalization of ijkx , since ijkx  is measured per person in the target group 
subpopulation, whereas ijk jkx z  is measured per person in the entire local population. 
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In normal circumstances, the allocation of expenditures and production to target groups is unobserved. 
However, the model is identified by imposing the following multiplicative structure on the marginal 
budget shares: 
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where ikβ  is the marginal budget share for service sector i, and ijkδ  is the share of sector-specific 
discretionary income in service sector i that is allocated to target group j. Inserting (7) into (6) and 
aggregating across target groups within each service sector yields 
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where 
 
(9)    
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J
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Thus Vi kα +  is by definition equal to the minimum variable cost in service sector i. 
 
In the normal case, estimation of the model as specified in (8) is not possible, since it is difficult to 
find measures of public outputs. For local governments, given their wide array of responsibilities, it is 
not feasible to measure all the relevant outputs. Thus, the variable costs on the left-hand side of 
expression (8) are unobserved. However, by inserting (3) into (8) the model is expressed in terms of 
expenditures rather than in terms of unobserved outputs: 
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By allowing the minimum quantity parameters ijγ  to vary across target groups, the modeling 
framework is flexible in the sense that it accounts for different needs for public services across 
different demographic groups. Moreover, the marginal budget share parameters of the model are 
allowed to vary as a function of observed heterogeneity: 
 
(11)   
0
0
, ( 1,2,..., ),
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ik i ih hk
h
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h
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where hkt  is a taste variable that affects the preferences for allocating discretionary income. For 
instance, the party composition of the local government council may influence such service priorities. 
This specification allows for different political priorities over service sectors across local 
governments. Such priorities are assumed to affect the allocation of discretionary income to services 
sectors. Since the marginal budget share parameters have to satisfy the adding-up conditions in (2) and 
(7), it is assumed that 0 0
1
1
S
i
i
θ β
=
+ =   and 
1
0
S
h ih
i
θ β
=
+ =   for 0h ≠ . 
 
Similarly as for the marginal budget share parameters, one may allow the fiscal capacity parameter 
kκ , the fixed cost parameters 
F
ikα  and the unit cost parameters ikπ  to vary as functions of observed 
characteristics.10 Fiscal capacity ( kκ ) may depend on more than one variable if local governments 
have access to more than one tax base or the tax function is non-linear. 
 
Environmental factors such as population density and travelling distances may affect both fixed costs 
and unit costs, while unit costs may also vary as a function of factor input prices. Note that a fixed cost 
that is constant across municipalities implies that the per capita fixed cost is decreasing as a function 
of population size. Thus fixed costs are specified as follows: 
                                                     
10 The specification of unit cost parameters is discussed in Aaberge et al. (2010). 
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(12)   0
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where 0
F
iα  is the constant component11 of fixed cost in sector i, hkc  is a variable that affects fixed 
costs, and Fihα  is the corresponding parameter for service sector i. By inserting the parameter 
heterogeneity specifications in (9), (11) and (12) into (10), and moreover specifying fiscal capacity 
( kκ ) and unit costs ( ikπ ) as functions of observable characteristics, an expenditure system is obtained 
where all parameters are identified.12 
II. Fiscal equalization 
 “Expenditure need” in the context of the model presented in Section I can be defined as the sum of 
fixed costs and minimum variable costs, and can thus be interpreted as the expenditure that is required 
to obtain a minimum standard ijγ  of public services for different target groups. Alternatively, 
expenditure needs might be defined for average service standards, which are discussed below. 
 
The widely acknowledged demand for fiscal equalization is commonly justified by referring to the 
principle of horizontal equity.13 This principle states that individuals who are equal or have equal 
needs should be given equal treatment. In the context of the structural model above, this means that 
individuals who belong to the same target group should receive equal public service production 
regardless of where they reside. Municipalities should therefore have equal economic opportunity to 
provide a standard package of public services. In order to achieve horizontal equity one may also 
require citizens to be exposed to equal tax rates or equal tax burdens across jurisdictions. 
 
Before defining the standard package of public services, it is convenient to make the following 
assumption about the unidentified parameters in the expenditure system: 
                                                     
11 The component is constant on the municipal level. The constant component is multiplied by inverse population size since 
the equations are normalized on a per capita basis. Thus the inverse population size is included as an artifact of 
normalization. 
12 Before estimation the equation system is extended with additive stochastic error terms, accounting for unexplained 
variation in the model. Thus the left-hand side variables in the theory model discussed above should be interpreted as 
expected values. 
13 Fiscal equity is defined as a modified form of horizontal equity, in which the aim is to equalize the potential of sub-
national governments to provide equal service levels at equal tax rates, without compelling them to do so. In some countries 
(e.g. Canada and Germany) this principle is enshrined in the constitution. Economists have put forward efficiency and equity 
arguments in favor of equalization, see e.g. Buchanan (1950), Mieszkowski and Musgrave (1999), Boadway (2004) and 
Allers (2012). 
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Recall that ijkδ  is the share received by target group j of the discretionary income that is allocated to 
service sector i. This share is assumed to be equal to target group j’s share of the total minimum 
required quantities in sector i. Stated equivalently, municipalities allocate sector-specific discretionary 
income to target groups proportional to each target group’s share of minimum variable costs in each 
service sector. This assumption is relatively simple and plausible, although other types of allocation 
are possible. However, it is not plausible to assume that discretionary income is used to finance fixed 
costs, since fixed costs are already subtracted in the definition of discretionary income. Consequently, 
it is assumed that discretionary income is used to increase variable costs above minimum 
expenditures, and thereby increase the output received by different target groups. 
 
The structural model includes sector-specific marginal budget shares ( ikβ  and kθ ) that vary across 
municipalities as a function of taste variables that account for different preferences for allocating 
discretionary incomes. Equalization systems are normally meant to compensate for different economic 
circumstances, but not for different local priorities. Local governments in many countries are 
responsible for providing several different services. Decentralized decision-making means that local 
governments are allowed to make different priorities across service sectors. Consequently, fiscal 
equalization is generally aimed at equalizing the economic choice opportunities for local public 
service production, whereas local governments enjoy wide discretion to make their own priorities over 
different services. To facilitate accountability, the ambition is restricted to compensate for cost factors 
and fiscal capacity that are largely or entirely beyond the control of local authorities. Equalization 
grants are only allowed to affect local government priorities in a lump-sum manner that expands the 
available economic resources. 
 
To focus on the goal of equity rather than decentralization, horizontal equity is defined for the case 
where preferences for allocating discretionary incomes are proportional to the sector-specific shares of 
minimum variable costs. This hypothetical benchmark is based on the view that minimum quantity, 
unit cost, and fixed cost parameters provide sufficient information to evaluate expenditure needs. 
 
Condition 1: (Marginal budget shares equal minimum variable cost shares) Minimum variable cost 
shares are defined as the shares of total minimum variable costs that are allocated to each service 
13 
sector. Thus it is assumed that V Vik i k kβ α α+ ++= , ( 1, 2,...,i S= ). The corresponding benchmark for 
the marginal budget share allocated to tax reduction is 0kθ = . 
 
Marginal budget shares equal to minimum variable cost shares implies that discretionary incomes are 
allocated to service sectors (and target groups) in the same proportion as minimum variable costs. 
Note also that equation (13) and Condition 1 satisfy the adding-up conditions in equation (7). Inserting 
Condition 1 and equation (13) into (7) and (6) yields k kv κ=  and 
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The ratio ka  will in general vary across municipalities. However, a special case relevant for fiscal 
equalization is defined by 
 
Condition 2: (Horizontal equity) In this case the ratio ka  is constant across municipalities, and 
expressed as ka a= . This means that members of the same target group are treated equally across 
municipalities. Moreover, tax rates are equal at the maximum acceptable level, which defines fiscal 
capacity kκ . 
 
From the condition of horizontal equity it follows that ijkx  is equalized across municipalities, since 
* (1 )ij ijx a γ= +  is a constant which is defined as the standard package of public services for service i 
targeted to group j. Thus the output per person in all target groups is constant across all municipalities 
in all the service sectors. To derive the ratio a  it is necessary to take into account the central 
government budget constraint for allocating incomes to municipalities 
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1
,
K
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k
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where y  is total per capita block grants from the central government, and n  is total population in the 
country. Inserting Condition 2 into equation (14) and aggregating across municipalities yields 
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=    is total per capita minimum variable cost in 
the whole country. Inserting Condition 2 and equation (16) into (14) yields 
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where *ky  is the allocation of central government funding to municipalities that satisfies the condition 
of horizontal equity. Equation (17) shows that to obtain horizontal equity, each municipality should 
receive funding for its fixed costs and variable minimum costs subtracted local fiscal capacity. It 
should also receive total per capita discretionary income in the whole country multiplied by a cost 
index for minimum variable costs ( V Vkα α++ ). If minimum variable costs in municipality k are above 
(below) the national average, municipality k receives higher (lower) than average discretionary 
incomes. 
 
Finally, from equation (17) one may denote 
F V F
k k
V
k
y
n n
α α α
α
+ ++  + −  
  as the “expenditure need” of 
municipality k in the case where expenditure needs are defined for average service standards provided 
to all target groups. According to this definition, the central government should provide compensation 
for the fixed costs of each municipality. Aggregate incomes over and above aggregate fixed costs 
should be allocated in proportion to per capita minimum variable costs in different municipalities.14 
 
If equation (13) and/or Condition 1 is violated, the allocation may of course not satisfy horizontal 
equity even if (17) is satisfied. Nevertheless, the central government could apply the equalization rule 
                                                     
14 Boadway (2004) argues that for some cost factors, the equity advantage of more equal provision must be weighted against 
the efficiency costs. If it is more costly to deliver public services in rural areas than urban areas, it is inefficient for an 
equalization program to neutralize these cost differences. For instance, equalization payments favoring small municipalities 
could prevent them from amalgamating. To accommodate this criticism, the equalization formula in (17) could be adjusted 
by reducing or eliminating compensation for variation in fixed costs and unit costs. 
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in (17) based on the view that it would equalize the economic opportunities to provide the standard 
package of public services. That being the case, it would be relevant to control for taste variables in 
the estimation of the structural model, although we do not want to compensate municipalities for 
different priorities or variation in taste variables. 
III. Reduced form 
A conventional procedure in the economic literature and also applied by practitioners in the design of 
national grant systems, is to derive expenditure needs from reduced form models. An advantage of the 
reduced form approach is that it can be applied in cases where measures of output are not observed, as 
opposed to the cost function approach which requires observed outputs. However, the absence of 
reliable output measures does not concern the choice between a reduced form and a structural 
approach, since neither approach requires observed outputs. 
 
To apply the fiscal equalization formula in equation (17) it is necessary to estimate the structural LES 
system. An interesting question is whether reduced form parameters can be given a meaningful 
interpretation as measures of expenditure needs, i.e., we have to explore whether the fiscal 
equalization condition (17) can be expressed in terms of the reduced form parameters. 
 
Recall that structural and reduced form parameters differ by definition, inasmuch as structural 
parameters are defined to characterize preferences and cost functions. By contrast, reduced form 
parameters are measuring the partial marginal effect of a change in a given exogenous variable on 
different endogenous variables. Reduced form parameters are commonly estimated in partial (single-
equation) regression models. However, reduced form parameters can also be derived from 
simultaneous equation models. 
 
To simplify the discussion of reduced form parameters, a linear version of the simultaneous model is 
used, which excludes interaction effects by assuming that 1ikπ = , ik iβ β=  (i=1, 2,…,S). Thus, it is 
assumed that unit costs and marginal budget shares are constant across municipalities. When unit costs 
are assumed constant it follows from (9) that variable cost is given by 
1
J
V
i k ij jk
j
zα γ+
=
= . Moreover, the 
discussion is further simplified by assuming no local tax discretion, which means that 
0k k kv κ θ= = = . The simplified linear version of the expenditure system (LES) is derived by 
inserting the specification of fixed cost parameters in (12) into (10) to get, for 1,...,i S=  
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In (18) the sector-specific expenditure is expressed as a function of inverse population size, other 
environmental cost factors, demographic variables accounting for the needs of different target groups, 
and local government revenue. 
 
The reduced form parameters are defined as the marginal effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable in different equations. The reduced form for spending on service sector i is 
therefore given by 
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where ihλ  is the reduced form parameter for environmental factor h that affects fixed costs, and ijφ  is 
the reduced form parameter for the population share of target group j. 15 The reduced form parameter 
for local government revenue is equal to the marginal budget share iβ , which is also a structural 
parameter characterizing the preferences of local governments. From (18) and (19) it follows that the 
remaining reduced form parameters can be expressed as functions of structural parameters: 
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As can be seen from (20), reduced form parameters differ from the structural parameters in cases 
where the marginal budget share parameters are positive (which is the case for normal goods). The 
reduced form parameters are defined as linear combinations of structural parameters related to 
                                                     
15 Although theoretical considerations or statistical testing may substantiate why a given explanatory variable is excluded 
from the specification of fixed cost or minimum quantity in a given service sector, this does not imply that the same variable 
should be excluded for this service sector when specifying the reduced form. The reason for this is that each reduced form 
equation includes all variables that are included in one or more of the structural equations, since all variables enter into all 
structural equations by being included in the discretionary income. 
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different service sectors. This proves that the reduced form and the structural form represent different 
parameterizations of the simultaneous conditional probability distribution of local public expenditures. 
 
The effect measured by a given reduced form parameter is downward biased compared to the effect 
measured by the corresponding structural fixed cost or minimum quantity parameter. In particular, the 
downward bias is aggravated for explanatory variables that affect costs positively in several service 
sectors. Note also that 
1
0S ihi λ= =  and 1 0S iji φ= = , which shows that the sum of reduced form 
parameters across service sectors cannot be used as a basis for assessing total expenditure need for a 
given cost factor or target group. 
 
The structural fixed cost and minimum quantity parameters are interpreted as measures of minimum 
expenditure needs, since horizontal equity will be satisfied when all municipalities provide services to 
all target groups just to cover minimum quantities. This structural measure of expenditure need is 
included as a component in the reduced form parameters in (20), which is measured by the parameters 
F
ihα  and ijγ , respectively. However, there is a downward bias connected to the negative terms 
1
S F
i ihi
β α
=
−    and 1Si ijiβ γ=−  . These terms are interpreted as the change in discretionary income 
allocated to service sector i, which results from a marginal increase in cost factor h or the population 
share of target group j, respectively. 
 
Since total revenues are constant, a partial marginal increase in cost factor h or the population share of 
target group j implies a decrease in discretionary income, which is allocated to service sectors in line 
with the marginal budget shares ( iβ ). This negative effect is offsetting the positive effect of increased 
expenditure need on actual expenditure. The decrease in allocated discretionary income depends on 
the marginal budget share in sector i and on minimum expenditure needs partly from other service 
sectors than sector i. When cost factor h or target group j affects expenditure needs in more than one 
service sector, the corresponding reduced form parameters conflate expenditure needs from different 
service sectors. This is because the reduced form parameters identify marginal effects on expenditures 
rather than on expenditure needs. The difference between the two types of effect comes about because 
(i) marginal effects on expenditures capture both the change in expenditure need and the change in 
discretionary income and its distribution to service sectors, and (ii) marginal effects on expenditures 
include a share of the change in expenditure needs in other service sectors than the one that is 
analyzed. 
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Thus the information contained in reduced form parameters does not distinguish between effects on 
minimum expenditure needs and discretionary incomes, and it also confuses expenditure needs in 
different service sectors. Structural parameters are the relevant parameters for defining and measuring 
expenditure needs in the context of the linear expenditure system (LES).16 
 
The fiscal equalization formula (17) can be considered as a counterfactual policy for distributing 
intergovernmental grants. Even if the reduced form model is identified and reduced form parameter 
estimates are consistent, they do not provide the information required to simulate (or implement) the 
counterfactual policy. 
IV. The Norwegian case 
Norway emerges as an interesting country for studying intergovernmental transfers for reasons beyond 
data availability and quality. First of all, Norway is a relatively large country with a dispersed 
population and relatively large public sector where local governments play an important role in the 
provision of public services. Before 1986, the grant system consisted of a large number of service-
specific matching grants, but through major reforms in 1986 and 1997 the funding of local 
governments was changed to rely heavily on unconditional block grants combined with local 
government tax revenues. The reform process aimed to decentralize decision powers to the local level 
while at the same time increasing accountability and budget control. As part of the process the central 
government introduced and developed the national equalization system which compensates for 
different expenditure needs and fiscal capacities. 
 
Fiscal capacity equalization in Norway means compensating for variation in income tax revenues. 
Expenditure need equalization accounts for demographic and geographic characteristics that affect 
expenditure needs according to expert judgment; they are moreover regarded “objective” in the sense 
that the compensation criteria are beyond the control of local governments.17 Apart from equalization 
grants the system also includes unconditional grants that aim to promote regional development in 
Northern Norway and in small municipalities. The Northern Norway grant is a per capita lump-sum 
which is fixed within each of the three Counties in Northern Norway.18 The small municipality grant is 
                                                     
16 The common approach using linear reduced form single-equation models for analyzing expenditure needs can be 
considered as reduced form versions of the LES model. This interpretation follows from the fact that LES is the only 
expenditure model that is linear and consistent with utility maximization for a given budget constraint. 
17 When the compensation criteria are beyond the control of local governments the received equalization grants can be 
considered as exogenous. 
18 The per capita grant in 2008 was 1457 NOK in Nordland, 2795 NOK in Troms and 6828 NOK in Finnmark. 
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given as a lump-sum to municipalities with less than 3,200 residents and less than 110 percent of the 
national average of income tax per capita.19 
 
Local governments in Norway have several sources of tax revenues. Income taxes make up a large 
share of local public taxes in Norway. The average share is 64 percent in 2008. However, the local 
income tax base as well as the tax rate is determined by the central government, which means that the 
tax is not really a local tax, since local authorities have little opportunity to affect the collected taxes. 
These taxes should therefore be regarded as an integrated element of the centralized system of 
financing. Since local tax discretion is severely limited, it makes sense to define fiscal capacity for 
local income tax simply by observed tax revenues. Fiscal capacity equalization in Norway is restricted 
to redistribution of income taxes. 
 
The second most important source of local tax revenue is user fees paid by the recipients of local 
public services. User fees on average account for 28 percent of local public taxes in 2008. Local 
governments are allowed to charge user fees for childcare, day-care facilities for school children, 
elderly care and utilities such as water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection. The tax base 
for user fees is the production of services that are subject to such charges. The extra revenue generated 
from increasing the output of services subject to user fees must be positive if the user charges per unit 
of output are kept constant. As discussed by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003), this means that an 
increase in intergovernmental grants may induce user fee hikes if the positive volume effect is greater 
than the negative price effect. 
 
A third source of taxation is taxes paid by power plants, where the tax base is natural resources such as 
waterfalls that are utilized in the production of hydroelectric power. The tax bases include production 
of energy and property values of the power plants. Similar to the income tax, the tax bases as well as 
the tax rates are determined by the central government, and therefore beyond the control of local 
governments. 
 
A fourth source of taxation is property taxes on housing. Until recently municipalities were only 
allowed to collect housing property taxes in densely populated areas. The tax base is derived from 
appraised property values. The rates are allowed to vary between 0 and 0.7 percent of the appraised 
property value, which means that local governments have tax discretion for this revenue type. 
                                                     
19 The lump sum does not vary with municipality size. In 2008, the grant was 10.4 million NOK per municipality in the 
northernmost zone (Finnmark) and 5.3 million NOK per municipality in the rest of the country. 
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Although local governments in Norway have some revenue-related discretion, the scope for 
decentralized decision-making is more extensive when it comes to spending money on different 
services. Local governments are legally responsible for providing certain services, but they also enjoy 
the freedom to prioritize between different services while taking into account the budget constraint. 
According to the services that are typically provided by local governments in Norway, their activities 
are classified in 12 service sectors. Table 1 displays the allocation of spending to the different services. 
There are considerable differences in per capita expenditure shares in all service sectors. 
Table 1. Summary statistics of public spending on different services, in percent, 2008  
Sector Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Administration 10.2 3.1 3.7 20.0 
Primary education 20.8 2.7 12.2 30.4 
Other education 2.4 1.0 0.5 9.0 
Childcare 10.5 3.1 4.6 20.7 
Health care 4.8 1.4 2.7 10.3 
Social services 2.8 1.4 0.1 8.2 
Child protection 2.5 1.0 0.2 10.8 
Long-term care 30.7 4.5 19.1 46.7 
Culture 3.6 1.1 1.5 10.3 
Road maintenance 1.7 0.7 0.0 3.8 
Water, sewage, and refuse 3.9 1.7 0.0 13.9 
Other infrastructure 6.2 2.3 0.3 18.9 
Note: Number of observations = 402. Local public expenditure shares are measured inclusive of user fees. 
 
The largest expenditure component is care for the elderly and disabled (long-term care), followed by 
primary education which provides ten years of education for children aged 6–15. The child-care sector 
provides daycare facilities for children aged 1–5. Other education is associated with after-school 
education and adult education. Local governments are responsible for health care provided by general 
practitioners. Social services include social assistance and temperance support to disadvantaged 
families, while child protection includes investigation of alleged child abuse, orphan homes, foster 
care, adoption services, and services aimed at supporting at-risk families so they can remain intact. 
The culture sector takes responsibility for sports, arts, museums, libraries, cinemas and churches. 
Other infrastructure includes municipal housing and commercial development. 
V. Empirical results 
The model which is derived by inserting parameter heterogeneity such as specified in equations (9), 
(11) and (12) into equation (10), is estimated based on detailed local government accounts and 
community characteristics of Norwegian municipalities in 2008. The model accounts for spending on 
the twelve service sectors displayed in Table 1, and the estimation also includes the budget surplus 
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(net operating result) as a sector in the model. The budget surplus is treated as a residual sector, which 
means that the model represents an extended linear expenditure system, see Lluch (1973). 
 
Two different versions of the model are estimated to account for endogenous income components.  Model 
1 includes an equation for housing property taxes and another equation for user fees. Thus expenditures 
are defined inclusive of user fees in Model 1. Model 2 includes the same equations as Model 1, except 
that there is no equation for user fees in Model 2. Thus expenditures and incomes are defined exclusive of 
user fees in Model 2. Each of the two models is estimated simultaneously by the method of maximum 
likelihood, after including error terms in the equation system that are assumed to have a multinormal 
distribution with mean 0 and unrestricted covariance matrix. Table 2 reports R2-adjusted as a measure of 
model fit, which shows that the goodness of fit is fairly high for most of the model equations, not least for 
larger service sectors such as long-term care, primary education, administration and childcare. 
Table 2. Model fit measured by R2 adjusted, 2008 
Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Prop-
erty 
taxes 
User 
fees 
Model 1 0.89 0.80 0.35 0.64 0.74 0.57 0.16 0.88 0.58 0.65 0.26 0.55 0.16 0.43 
Model 2 0.89 0.80 0.39 0.62 0.73 0.57 0.16 0.86 0.64 0.67 0.01 0.49 0.16 – 
Note: Number of observations = 402. The dependent variables are per capita expenditures in equation 1-12, and per capita incomes in the 
remaining equations. The model equation and sector numbers refer to 
Equation 1: Administration Equation 5: Health care Equation 9: Culture 
Equation 2: Primary education Equation 6: Social assistance Equation 10: Road maintenance 
Equation 3: Other Education Equation 7: Child protection Equation 11: Water, sewage and refuse treatment 
Equation 4: Childcare Equation 8: Long-term care Equation 12: Other infrastructure 
 
Since labor is the main input in local public service production, the unit cost parameters may vary as a 
function of local wages. In Norway, local government wage rates are set in a centralized system of 
bargaining. It is assumed that that wage rates do not vary across municipalities. However, a factor that 
may affect unit costs is the dispersion of the local settlement pattern. The dispersion of settlements is 
accounted for by a variable defined as the average distance to the centre of the municipal sub-district.20 
Higher travelling distances may increase unit costs in primary education, elderly care and health care. 
For example, when it comes to primary education, municipalities with high settlement dispersion tend 
to supply a decentralized school structure with relatively few students per school and rather small 
classes. Moreover, higher settlement dispersion may increase unit costs in ambulant home care for the 
elderly and disabled, because staff travelling time between recipient homes increases with dispersion. 
                                                     
20 The distance variable is based on administrative register data for the entire Norwegian population combining information 
on roads and household location by geographical coordinates. 
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Similarly, patients in primary health care are entitled to a general practitioner with a surgery within 
reasonable travelling distance. The costs of maintaining such services are therefore higher in sparsely 
populated areas. 
 
The distance variable may also affect fixed costs in service production. Higher fixed costs may accrue 
when travelling distances are higher. That notwithstanding, when the distance variable is included in 
both unit cost and fixed cost parameters, it turns out that the parameter estimates for the distance 
variable display instability and large standard errors, an indication of multicollinearity. We have 
therefore simplified the analysis by assuming that the impact of the distance variable is operating 
through an effect on fixed costs, which means that unit costs are assumed to be constant ( 1ikπ = , i=1, 
2,…,12) across municipalities in the Norwegian case. The impact of this assumption on the derived 
fiscal equalization scheme is tested against an alternative assumption in the sensitivity analysis below. 
Estimation of minimum quantities 
The target groups included in the analysis are derived from knowledge of Norwegian institutions and 
central government regulations of local government responsibilities. For each service sector certain 
exclusion restrictions are imposed, since all target groups do not necessarily receive every one of the 
different services. For instance, the elderly receive long-term care, but they are not included as recipients 
of child care services or primary education, since they are not entitled to such services. Thus the included 
effects of explanatory variables have to be theoretically plausible. Furthermore, the target groups that are 
affecting minimum quantities in different service sectors are largely the same as those compensated for 
in the Norwegian cost-equalization formula. Broadly speaking, the included explanatory variables may 
therefore express a national expert consensus about heterogeneity in expenditure needs. The relevant 
target groups have been subject to extensive testing, which means that the hypothesized explanatory 
variables are included in the model when the estimated effects on spending are significant. 
 
Measurement of the size of different subpopulations is mainly based on administrative register data with 
demographic and geographic information for the entire resident population in Norway. The subpopulations 
that form the target groups in the study include the population in each municipality by age groups, refugee 
status, employment status, marital status and poverty status.21 The register data contain information on the 
composition of households and family relationships, which means that children can be related to the status 
                                                     
21 To be defined as poor the household must have less than 50 percent of median cash income, using the OECD scale to make 
incomes comparable across households. The data on cash income is based on Tax Assessment Files, which are collected from 
tax records and other administrative registers, rather than interviews and self-reporting methods. 
23 
of their parents. Besides the available register data information, municipalities report additional information 
on the number of mentally disabled and high-needs recipients in each municipality. 
 
The variables in Table 3 account for variation in minimum quantities across target groups as specified 
in equation (9), which is inserted into (10) before estimation of the model, assuming that unit costs are 
constant. The parameter estimates in Table 3 show the increase in minimum quantity when the target 
group is increased by one person. One main finding is the substantial variation in the minimum 
quantity estimates across target groups and service sectors. For instance, the 6–15 age-group receives 
primary education and other education (after-school education). The minimum quantity for this group 
is more than ten times higher in primary education compared to after-school education. Recently 
domiciled refugees receive other education (adult education) and social services. For this group, the 
received amount is higher in adult education. 
Table 3. Estimated minimum quantity parameters and corresponding reduced form esti-
mates, 2008  
Model 1 Model 2 Sector Target group 
Structural 
form 
Reduced 
form 
Structural 
form 
Reduced 
form 
Administration All residents 1391** 1748 1722** 1753 
Primary education Population aged 6–15 53186** 46113 55030** 48150 
Other education Population aged 6–15 5086** 4116 2302** 1055 
 Recently domiciled refugees 93879** 91222 83748** 80509 
Child care Children aged 1–5 with full-time employed 
parents 
108083** 102683 102717** 98424 
 Remaining children aged 1–5 61441** 58371 52466** 50273 
Health care All residents 866** 988 995** 1004 
Social services Recently domiciled refugees 65638** 63822 65178** 63429 
 Other refugees 7680* 7593 7062 6979 
 Divorced and separated, aged 16–59 7839** 7593 8352** 6979 
 Unemployed, aged 16–59  29720** 29382 28014** 27685 
 Poor residents 6812* 6734 6819* 6739 
Child protection Children aged 0–15 with lone parent 23337** 22912 23394** 22954 
 Poor children aged 0–15 22168* 21765 24886** 24418 
Long-term care Population aged 0–66 1765 1419 2405** 1950 
 Population aged 67–79 33097** 26603 30744** 24927 
 Population aged 80–89 52343** 42074 44052** 35717 
 Population aged 90 and above 234260** 188301 187315** 151872 
 Mentally disabled in ordinary municipalities 255149** 205092 213702** 173266 
 Mentally disabled in host municipalities 949801** 763460 905123** 733859 
 High-needs recipients 915619** 735984 963666** 781325 
Culture All residents 690** 839 753** 765 
Road maintenance All residents -45 12 -38 -33 
Water, sewage, and refuse All residents 956** 1039 -701** -701 
Other infrastructure All residents 596 928 -99 -77 
Note: All estimates are in NOK. (1 Euro equals about 8 NOK). ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. Reduced form estimates 
are reported as mean values. 
 
In child care the target 1–5 age-group is divided into children with or without parents in full-time 
employment. The marginal cost is higher for the group of full-time employed parents, since these 
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families depend more on professional day-care services, increasing demand for and coverage in 
kindergartens. In the child protection sector, the recipients are identified as children with a lone parent 
and children in poor households. In social services, the recipients are either refugees, divorced, 
separated, unemployed, or poor. 
 
Long-term care includes nursing homes, ambulant nurses and home care. The potential recipients are 
the elderly and disabled. Minimum quantities are found to increase with age, and are highest for the 
elderly aged 90 and above. In contrast, spending needs per person are much lower in the 0–66 age 
group. However, three additional target groups are included to account for high expenditure needs for 
persons with severe disablement. The mentally disabled are divided into two groups residing in 
appointed host municipalities and other municipalities, respectively. The cost for clients in host 
municipalities is found to be relatively high. A third group including patients who are reported to have 
a high degree of disability and in need of intensive round-the-clock care, is found to have a large 
marginal impact on expenditure needs. 
 
When it comes to administration, municipal health care, culture, road maintenance, water supply, 
sewage treatment, refuse collection, and other infrastructure, the target group is taken to be the entire 
population in each municipality. Thus, the estimated minimum quantity is a constant. 
 
The different estimates in the structural form of Model 1 and Model 2 are interpreted as resulting from 
the difference between marginal effects on gross expenditures (including user fees) and net expenditures 
(excluding user fees). For that reason, the structural form estimates are in many cases smaller in Model 
2, particularly in service sectors that are partly financed by user fees. These latter service sectors are 
other education, child care, long-term care and water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection. 
 
Table 3 shows that the estimated reduced form parameters in many cases are smaller than the structural 
form estimates, as would be expected by closer inspection of equation (20). The difference between 
reduced form and structural form estimates is larger for service sectors with a high marginal budget share 
(long-term care and primary education) and for target groups that are included in more than one service 
sector (population aged 6–15 and recently domiciled refugees). The reduced form effect for all residents 
is larger than the structural form effect in some service sectors.22 For other included target groups 
                                                     
22 This is due to a negative structural constant term estimate in the sector for net operating result in both models and a 
positive structural constant term estimate in the equation for user fees in Model 1. 
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besides constant terms (accounting for all residents), the reduced form estimates vary between 46 percent 
and 99 percent of the structural form estimates of minimum quantities. 
Estimation of fixed costs 
The variables in Table 4 account for variation in sector-specific fixed costs as specified in equation 
(12), which is inserted into (10) before estimation of the model. Thus the parameter estimates in Table 
4 show the impact of variables affecting fixed costs in the estimated models. There are significant 
fixed costs in eight of the service sectors. Since per capita expenditures are on the left-hand side in the 
service sector equations, it is the effect of inverse population size that accounts for a fixed cost that is 
constant across municipalities. The fixed cost is estimated to be 4.4 million NOK in administration in 
Model 1. After aggregating over service sectors it was found that total fixed cost accounted for by 
inverse population size was 11.7 million NOK in Model 1 and 11.3 million NOK in Model 2. The 
difference between the two models may suggest that some of the fixed costs are financed by user fees, 
particularly in long-term care and water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection. 
The distance to municipal sub-district centers is found to increase fixed costs in primary education, 
health care and long-term care. The fixed cost in road maintenance depends on the length of municipal 
roads measured in kilometers.23 Furthermore, the fixed cost for keeping roads open is found to 
increase with the amount of snowfall during the year.24 Local variation in requirements for sewage 
purification derives from national environmental regulations, and is found to affect the fixed cost in 
sewage disposal in Model 1.25 However, the difference between Model 1 and 2 shows that the fixed 
cost for sewage purification is largely financed by user fees. 
 
As expected, the difference between structural form and reduced form estimates is particularly large 
for variables featured in several service sectors, such as inverse population size and the distance 
variable. In administration, the reduced form effect of inverse population size is estimated to be about 
60 percent of the structural form estimate. Moreover, for inverse population size, it is found that the 
reduced form estimates are negative in long-term care (Model 2), culture, water supply, sewage 
treatment, and refuse collection (Model 1) and other infrastructure, although the corresponding 
structural form estimates are significantly positive.26 Thus there are substantial downward biases in 
reduced form estimates for fixed costs. The largest downward bias in the reduced form effect of the 
                                                     
23 Data are collected by The Norwegian Public Roads Administration. 
24 The data source is The Norwegian Meteorological Institute, which observes weather conditions on a high number of 
metering stations around the country. 
25 Data on type and capacity for purification are reported from the treatment plants to Statistics Norway. 
26 Inverse population size has been included in the sector for water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection because 
the estimate is close to being significant at the 5%-level in Model 1. 
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distance variable is found in long-term care, which is due to the relatively high marginal budget share 
of this service sector. 
Table 4. Estimated fixed cost parameters and corresponding reduced form estimates, 2008  
Model 1 Model 2 Sector Environmental cost 
factor Structural 
form 
Reduced 
form 
Structural 
form 
Reduced 
form 
Administration Inverse population size 4438500** 2664691 4521541** 2747859
Primary education Inverse population size 1820863** 508092 1999152** 649176
 Distance to municipal 
sub-district centre 
1338** 1035 1342** 1062
Health care Inverse population size 1603941** 997628 1484281** 939118
 Distance to municipal 
sub-district centre 
348** 209 301** 188
Long-term care Inverse population size 2260657** 138505 1789784** -338921
 Distance to municipal 
sub-district centre 
807** 318 688** 247
Culture Inverse population size 366439* -371550 450764** -265770
Road maintenance Length of municipal 
roads 
19444** 18937 19585** 19072
 Amount of snowfall 80** 78 83** 81
Water, sewage, and refuse Inverse population size 393353 -22292 160787 164320
 Sewage purification 
degree 
653** 628 47 47
Other infrastructure Inverse population size 849311* -803232 843816** -453870
Note: All estimates are in NOK. (1 Euro equals about 8 NOK). ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. Reduced form estimates 
are reported as mean values. 
Estimation of fiscal capacity 
In the analysis of fiscal capacity for housing property taxation, the measurement of the tax base in 
different municipalities is based on hedonic estimation of property values, where the appraised 
property value is a function of the age, size (in square meters), and location (by neighborhood) of each 
dwelling. This model has been developed in Statistics Norway and is used by central government as 
the base for national property wealth taxation. The tax base is shared with local governments by 
allowing them to impose housing property taxes on local residents. However, when the estimated 
property values are included as heterogeneity in the fiscal capacity parameter for local housing 
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property taxes, it turns out that the effect of appraised property value is insignificant. This result 
suggests that the chosen tax rates are negatively correlated with the tax base. 
 
Estimation results for fiscal capacity for housing property taxes are reported in Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. Since the local housing property tax has been legally restricted to densely populated areas, 
the population share in densely populated areas is included in the estimation. The results show that 
population density squared has a significant positive effect on municipal property tax income. The 
second variable included is the share of representatives from Conservative Party and Progress Party 
elected to the Municipal Council.27 These two political parties are known to campaign against property 
taxation. The model includes a direct effect of party composition, but also an interaction effect 
between party composition and population density. As expected, it is found that a higher share of 
Conservative Party and Progress Party council members correlates with lower housing property taxes 
in densely populated areas. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of higher representation of the two 
parties is positive in the most sparsely populated municipalities. 
 
Estimation results for fiscal capacity for user fees are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The 
fiscal capacity model for user fees includes target groups and variables affecting fixed costs in service 
sectors that are partly financed by user fees. The derived significant effects are associated to long-term 
care and water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection. Since these two service sectors collect 
a large share of the user fees, the fiscal capacity for user fees is related to variables accounting for 
expenditure needs in the two sectors. It is found that fiscal capacity for user fees is particularly high in 
municipalities with a high population share aged 90 and over. Many members of this age group live in 
nursing homes where they have to pay relatively high user fees. User fees are also found to increase as 
a function of inverse population size and sewage purification level, which owes to the fact that costs in 
water supply, sewage treatment, and refuse collection are largely financed by user fees. 
Estimation of marginal budget shares 
Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix display the estimated coefficients of marginal budget shares in 
Models 1 and 2, respectively. The variables in Tables B.1 and B.2 account for variation in marginal 
budget shares as specified in equation (11), which is inserted into (10) before estimation of the model.  
Marginal budget shares are specified as depending on a constant term, the share of socialist 
representatives on the municipal council, and the average education level in the 30–59 age-group.28 It 
                                                     
27 The data source is The Norwegian Election Database (Statistics Norway). 
28 The data source is administrative register data. 
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is found that socialist parties give high priority to social services, including social assistance and 
temperance support to disadvantaged families. The higher the education level, the stronger the local 
government preference for social services, child protection, culture and other infrastructure, while the 
priority of administration is low in well educated communities. The estimated marginal budget shares 
for user fees are negative, meaning that user fees increase as a function of discretionary incomes. This 
result suggests that the positive volume effect prevails over the negative price effect in the response of 
user fees to an increase in discretionary incomes. It also implies a strong flypaper effect since local 
governments respond to increasing grants by crowding out private consumption rather than passing on 
money to the private sector. 
Fiscal disparities 
A relevant policy scenario is to redistribute the incomes of local governments to satisfy horizontal 
equity as defined in equation (17). Thus Model 1 is used to simulate the distribution of the sum of 
intergovernmental grants and tax incomes that satisfies the equalization formula derived above. For 
this purpose the fiscal capacity for housing property taxes is not compensated in the application of the 
equalization scheme.29 To evaluate the policy impact of the hypothetical redistribution, we define 
fiscal disparity as the difference between the actual allocation and the equalizing allocation in (17). 
Table 5. Summary statistics of fiscal disparities by municipality size, in percent of actual in-
come, Model 1, 2008  
Municipality size Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
0–1999 81 16.4 12.2 -0.6 55.0 
2000–4999 130 7.4 12.7 -12.4 50.4 
5000–9999 90 -1.7 9.9 -16.2 38.4 
10000–19999 53 -5.7 5.3 -13.8 10.6 
20000–49999 36 -5.1 4.3 -14.7 6.8 
50000 residents or more 12 -1.2 6.5 -9.6 9.7 
Note: Fiscal disparity is defined by the difference between actual income and counterfactual income allocated to obtain horizontal equity. 
 
In Table 5 summary statistics of fiscal disparities are reported in percent of actual income, defined by 
( )*100* /k k ky y y− , where ky  is actual income and *ky  is counterfactual income derived from the 
equalization scheme. The results clearly indicate that many of the municipalities would experience a 
significant change in their incomes if the equalization scheme in equation (17) was implemented. This 
means that fiscal equalization is far from achieved in Norway. In particular, small municipalities are 
overrepresented among municipalities with relatively high actual incomes as compared to the 
                                                     
29 This exclusion is done because the impact of appraised property value on the housing property tax is insignificant, and 
moreover coincides with the chosen method in the Norwegian fiscal equalization system. 
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counterfactual equalization policy. The privileged position of many small municipalities is mainly a 
result of intergovernmental grants that aim to promote regional development in Northern Norway, as  
well as in small municipalities in Southern Norway. Moreover, small municipalities receive relatively 
high incomes from local taxes on natural resources which are not subject to fiscal capacity 
equalization in the Norwegian grant system. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The two different model specifications above result in different estimates of the structural parameters. 
Since one important aim of the present paper is to discuss methods for fiscal equalization, it is relevant 
to evaluate the difference between the two models by the different counterfactual incomes the 
municipalities would receive if the equalization formula (17) was implemented. 
Figure 1. Local government incomes distributed to allow horizontal equity in Models 1 and 2, 
2008 
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Note: Incomes are measured in NOK per capita (1 Euro equals about 8 NOK). 
 
The main difference between Models 1 and 2 is in the treatment of user fees. Fiscal capacity for user 
fees is specified in Model 1 but not in Model 2, since Model 2 excludes user fees from the expenditure 
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and income definition. This difference is reflected in how formula (17) is applied to the two models. 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the local government per capita incomes that result when incomes are 
distributed to yield horizontal equity in Models 1 and 2, respectively. It is demonstrated that the 
equalizing allocations produced by the two models are very highly correlated, with a Pearson’s R at 
0.999. Thus the proposed equalization scheme provides approximately the same distribution of 
incomes based on the two different models. 
 
As discussed above, it is difficult to determine empirically the degree to which the distance variable is 
affecting fixed costs or unit costs. It is assumed that the distance variable does affect fixed costs, but 
not unit costs in Models 1 and 2. The sensitivity of results to this assumption is studied by making the 
opposite assumption the basis for estimating alternative versions of the two models. The alternative 
models are identical to Models 1 and 2, except that the distance variable is assumed to affect unit costs 
instead of fixed costs in the relevant service sectors (primary education, health care and long-term 
care). As before, the sensitivity of results to this change in model specification is evaluated by the 
change in counterfactual equalization grants according to formula (17). It is found that the baseline 
and alternative model specifications produce allocations that are very highly correlated (Pearson’s R is 
0.991 in Model 1 and 0.993 in Model 2). Thus the equalizing allocation is rather insensitive to the 
alternative model specification with respect to the distance variable. 
 
As a final sensitivity analysis it is of interest to investigate the stability of results over time. For this 
purpose, Models 1 and 2 are estimated on cross section data for 2007 in addition to 2008. The total 
parameter stability is evaluated by comparing the equalizing allocation of incomes when parameters 
are estimated on 2007 or 2008 data, respectively. To isolate the effect of changing parameter estimates 
from the change in independent variables, the parameter estimates for 2007 are combined with data for 
2008 to simulate the equalizing allocation in 2008 based on parameter estimates in 2007. This 
allocation is compared to the equalizing allocation derived from 2008 parameter estimates and 2008 
data. The results of this exercise demonstrate that the parameter estimates in general are quite stable 
from 2007 to 2008 (Pearson’s R comparing equalizing allocations derived from 2007 and 2008 
estimates is 0.999 in Model 1 and 0.998 in Model 2).30 
 
                                                     
30 The party composition in Local Government Municipal Councils is changed every fourth year. Since 2007 was an election 
year, there was a political replacement from 2007 to 2008. Thus, it is heartening to find that parameter stability is high 
through this break in government. Furthermore, by comparing the estimates in this paper to estimates in Aaberge and 
Langørgen (2003), who estimated a similar model on data for 1993, it is found that the model is rather stable over a long time 
period. 
31 
The main purpose of this paper has been to compare structural and reduced form parameters, and to 
derive a method for fiscal equalization by means of structural modeling. This method could be further 
refined by utilizing panel data econometrics. Panel data allow the researcher to control for  
unobservable local characteristics. Nevertheless, for the purpose of fiscal equalization one could argue 
that only observable variation across municipalities should matter for the determination of equalization 
grants. For instance, in a fixed-effects model, it is not clear to what extent the local governments 
should be compensated for the fixed effects. A related problem is that the fixed effects wipe out the 
effect of any variable that is unchanging or highly correlated over time. In that sense, then, the fixed-
effects model may not allow the identification of cross-sectional variation that is relevant for fiscal 
equalization. Further discussion of such issues is left for future research. 
VI. Conclusion 
Equalization systems have a substantial impact on the distribution of incomes to sub-national 
governments in many countries around the world. The design of equalization systems may benefit 
from methods that utilize parameters derived from economic theory. At the same time, it is crucial to 
develop methods that are feasible to implement given limitations in the data, such as the absence of 
reliable output measures. 
 
The present paper shows that a structural simultaneous model can be used to analyze fiscal 
equalization in the common case where outputs are unobserved. This is done by invoking behavioral, 
technological, functional form and distributional assumptions, since such assumptions are needed to 
justify the interpretation of estimates as measures of expenditure need and fiscal capacity. Because 
fiscal equalization requires compensation for a comprehensive set of cost, need and capacity factors, it 
is hard to conceive that all the relevant structural parameters could be estimated by using quasi-
experimental methods (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2010) or sufficient statistic methods (see Chetty, 
2009). In contrast, a feasible strategy for the purpose of fiscal equalization is to estimate a full-fledged 
structural model. 
 
The linear expenditure system provides an attractive basis for empirical applications, since it allows 
estimation of fixed costs, unit costs, and minimum quantities that are basic in the definition of 
expenditure needs. The modeling approach provides the information necessary to give a precise 
definition of horizontal equity, which is the explicit goal that is used to justify fiscal equalization 
policies in many countries. In the empirical analysis it is found that the structural modeling framework 
yields plausible estimation results. By simulating intergovernmental grants according to the proposed 
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formula it is found that the equalizing allocation is robust to changes in specification of the structural 
model and to a change in the year of estimation. 
 
The structural approach proposed in this paper is compared to the common practice of using reduced 
form models as the basis for determining equalization grants. It is argued that the structural parameters 
of the linear expenditure system allow for an intuitively appealing interpretation, whereas parameters 
in reduced form models do not have a straightforward interpretation in terms of sector-specific 
expenditure needs. The estimation results show that reduced form estimates to varying degrees are 
smaller than the corresponding structural parameter estimates, and sometimes structural and reduced 
form estimates display opposite signs for a significant effect of a given explanatory variable in a given 
service sector. The difference between structural and reduced form estimates is relatively large in 
service sectors with a large marginal budget share, and for explanatory variables that affect 
expenditure needs in several service sectors. 
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Appendix 
Estimation of fiscal capacity parameters 
Table A.1 Estimated fiscal capacity parameters for housing property taxes, 2008 
 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 198 171
Population density (share in densely populated areas) -62 -62
Population density squared 1471** 1451**
Conservative and Progress Party share in Municipal Council 1281** 1212*
Population density * Conservative/Progress Party share   -3434** -3292**
Note: All estimates are in NOK. (1 Euro equals about 8 NOK). ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. 
Table A.2 Estimated fiscal capacity parameters for user fees, 2008 
 Model 1
Constant 3377**
Population aged 67–79 6333
Population aged 80–89  16404
Population aged 90 and above 61940*
Inverse population size 916216*
Sewage purification degree 582**
Note: All estimates are in NOK. (1 Euro equals about 8 NOK). ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. 
36 
Estimation of marginal budget share parameters 
Table B.1 Estimated marginal budget share parameters in Model 1, 2008 
 Constant Share of socialists Average education level
Administration 0.290** -0.007 -0.043**
Primary education 0.147** -0.013 -0.007
Other education -0.020 0.010 0.012*
Child care 0.022 -0.013 0.011
Health care 0.077** 0.004 -0.008
Social services -0.030 0.036** 0.010*
Child protection -0.029 0.009 0.015**
Long-term care 0.229** 0.021 -0.014
Culture 0.008 0.022 0.018*
Road maintenance 0.020* 0.007 0.001
Water, sewage, and refuse 0.055 0.001 -0.006
Other infrastructure 0.068 -0.001 0.030*
Housing property taxes 0.045* -0.019 -0.010
User fees -0.060 -0.045 -0.009
Note: ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. 
Table B.2 Estimated marginal budget share parameters in Model 2, 2008 
 Constant Share of socialists Average education level
Administration 0.290** -0.010 -0.045**
Primary education 0.136** -0.008 -0.004
Other education 0.011 0.001 0.004
Child care 0.018 -0.022 0.011
Health care 0.071** 0.003 -0.008
Social services -0.035 0.041** 0.011*
Child protection -0.038* 0.012 0.018**
Long-term care 0.249** 0.012 -0.023
Culture 0.012 0.018 0.016*
Road maintenance 0.032** 0.005 -0.003
Water, sewage, and refuse -0.004 -0.022 0.004
Other infrastructure 0.010 0.004 0.037**
Housing property taxes 0.048* -0.019 -0.011
Note: ** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level. 
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